A Code That Clicks a Link Votes on a Topic and Clicks Submit and Than Exits Link and Does It Again

Terminal Updated: Nov 2, 2021

Mis- and disinformation can undermine public conviction in the balloter process, equally well every bit in our republic.  Elections are administered by state and local officials who implement numerous safeguards to protect the security of your vote pursuant to various state and federal laws and processes. This resource is designed to deflate common misinformation and disinformation narratives and themes that relate broadly to the security of ballot infrastructure and related processes. It is not intended to address jurisdiction-specific claims. Instead, this resource addresses ballot security rumors past describing common and more often than not applicable protective processes, security measures, and legal requirements designed to protect against or observe big-scale security issues related to election infrastructure and processes.

You tin can learn more than nearly mis- and disinformation from CISA'south Mis-, Dis-, Malinformation (MDM) team. Click an icon below to get directly to that section.

New Rumor Vs. Reality

Reality: Safeguards protect the integrity of the postal service-in/absentee election procedure, including relating to the use of mail-in/absentee ballot request forms.

Rumor: People tin can hands violate the integrity of the mail-in/absentee ballot asking process to receive and bandage unauthorized mail-in/absentee ballots, or prevent authorized voters from voting successfully in person.

Get the Facts: Election officials use various security measures to protect the integrity of the mail service-in/absentee voting process, including those that protect against the unauthorized employ of ballot request forms, in states where such forms are used, the submission of mail-in/absentee ballots by ineligible individuals, and eligible in-person voters being erroneously precluded from being able to vote due to being listed in the poll book as having received a mail-in/absentee ballot.

Mail-in/absentee ballot request forms typically crave applicants to sign the form and affirm their eligibility to cast a mail-in/absentee ballot under penalty of constabulary. Upon receipt of a mail-in/absentee ballot request form, ballot officials implement varying procedures to verify the identity and eligibility of the applicant prior to sending the applicant a post-in/absentee ballot. Such procedures include checking the signature and data submitted on the class against the corresponding voter registration tape, as well as ensuring that multiple mail service-in/absentee ballots are not sent in response to applications using the aforementioned voter's data.

Election officials further implement varying procedures to verify the identity and eligibility of those who submit mail-in/absentee ballots. Those who submit mail-in/absentee ballots are required to sign the mail-in/absentee election envelope. In some states, a notarized signature, the signature of a witness or witnesses, and/or a copy of valid identification is also required. Upon receipt of a mail-in/absentee ballot, election officials verify the signature on the mail-in/absentee ballot envelope and/or that the mail-in/absentee election has been otherwise properly submitted prior to retrieving the ballot from its envelope and submitting information technology for counting. Some states notify the voter if in that location is a discrepancy or missing signature, affording the voter an opportunity to correct the outcome.

Land policies vary on how to handle an in-person voter who is listed in the poll book every bit having been sent a mail service-in/absentee election. In nearly states, the voter would be required to cast a provisional ballot that could be later on reviewed past election officials. In others, the voter may cast a regular election and whatever corresponding mail-in/absentee ballot returned in the proper noun of that voter would be rejected. In all such cases, instances of potential double voting or voter impersonation could be directed to advisable regime for investigation.

Useful Sources

• Mail-in Voting in 2022 Infrastructure Chance Cess, CISA
• Post-in Voting in 2022 Infrastructure Run a risk Infographic, CISA
• Postal service-in Voting Integrity Safeguards Infographic, CISA
• USPS Election Postal service Information Eye, USPS
• How States Verify Absentee Ballot Applications, NCSL
• How States Verify Voted Absentee Ballots, NCSL
• States That Permit Voters to Correct Signature Discrepancies, NCSL
• 52 United states of americaC. § 21082
• Provisional Ballots, NCSL
• State Policies on Voting In-Person or Changing Vote After Requesting a Mail service/Absentee Ballot, NASS
• Your local or state election officials. EAC state-by-land directory
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor25

Reality: Robust safeguards protect against tampering with ballots returned via drop box.

Rumor: Drop boxes used past ballot officials to collect returned mail service-in/absentee ballots tin be hands tampered with, stolen, or destroyed.

Become the Facts: Election officials use various safeguards to protect ballots returned by voters via drop boxes from being tampered with, stolen, or destroyed. Drop boxes located outdoors are typically made of heavy and loftier-form metal, bolted to the footing, and include security features such as locks, tamper-evident seals, minimally sized ballot insertion slots, and fire and water-impairment prevention features. Driblet boxes located indoors are typically staffed and protected past existing building security measures. Many ballot offices monitor their drop boxes via 24-hour video surveillance. Ballots returned via drop box are retrieved past election officials or designated individuals, often in bi-partisan teams, at frequent intervals.

Useful Sources

• Ballot Drop Box, Election Infrastructure Subsector's Government Coordinating Quango and Sector Coordinating Council Articulation COVID-19 Working Group
• Ballot Driblet Box Definitions, Pattern Features, Location, and Number, NCSL
• Voting Outside the Polling Identify: Absentee, All-Mail and other Voting at Home Options, NCSL
• Your local or state election officials. EAC state-by-state directory
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor24

Postal service-Election

Reality: Election treatment procedures protect against intentional or unintentional election destruction.

Rumor: Ballots tin can easily be destroyed without detection, preventing them from being counted.

Get the Facts:States have ballot processing and tabulation safeguards designed to ensure each ballot bandage in the election can be correctly counted. Land procedures often include robust chain-of-custody procedures, auditable logging requirements, and canvass processes. Election officials use these security mensurate to bank check that votes are accurately accounted for during processing and counting.

Per federal law, all ballots, applications, and registrations related to elections for federal offices, such as those for President and Vice President, Members of the U.S. Senate or Firm of Representatives, must exist retained and preserved for 22 months from the date of the election. In addition, many states also require specific state and local security protocols for stored ballots, such equally storage in a secure vault featuring double lock systems that tin but exist opened when authorized representatives from both political parties are present. This requirement is intended to ensure all ballots and relevant records, such as voter registrations, cannot be discarded, but are bachelor in case they are needed for recounts or audits to resolve any potential issues.

Election officials, based on state and local law, may discard non-relevant materials, such as addressed envelopes or duplicate applications. Taken out of context, images or video of election officials discarding papers may appear suspicious , but are likely depicting legal discarding of these non-relevant ballot materials.

Useful Sources:

• 52 U.S.C. § 20701
• Retention Chart for Boards of Elections, State of Ohio
• Election Infrastructure Security, CISA
• Election Infrastructure Cyber Risk Cess and Infographic, CISA
• Your local or country election officials. EAC state-past-state directory
• Link direct to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor22

Reality: Variations in vote totals for different contests on the aforementioned ballot occur in every ballot and do not by themselves indicate fraud or issues with voting technology.

Rumor: More votes in one competition than other contests on the ballot ways that results cannot be trusted.

Become the Facts:Variations in vote totals for different contests on the aforementioned election occur in every election. For instance, this can occur as a issue of "undervotes." These variations by themselves are not indications of problems with voting technology or the integrity of election processes or results.

An undervote occurs when a voter intentionally or unintentionally does non brand a option in a given contest on their election (e.g., a voter votes for a presidential candidate, but non for any candidates in other contests on their ballot) or, where a voter selects fewer than the maximum number allowed for a item competition. Undervotes commonly occur on so-called "down-ballot" races. For example, a voter may choose to vote for president, senator, and governor, only not for other offices or election measures that are lower down on their election. Even if a election includes an undervote in a particular contest, properly marked votes on their ballot are counted.

Useful Sources

• Your local or country election officials. EAC land-past-state directory
• Voter Intent Laws, NCSL
• Post-Election Audits, NCSL
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://world wide web.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor20

Reality: Robust safeguards including canvassing and auditing procedures help ensure the accuracy of official election results.

Rumor: A bad histrion could modify ballot results without detection.

Get the Facts: The systems and processes used past election officials to tabulate votes and certify official results are protected past various safeguards that help ensure the accurateness of election results. These safeguards include measures that help ensure tabulation systems role as intended, protect against malicious software, and enable the identification and correction of any irregularities.

Every land has voting system safeguards to ensure each election cast in the election can be correctly counted. State procedures oftentimes include testing and certification of voting systems, required auditable logs, and software checks, such as logic and accuracy tests, to ensure ballots are properly counted earlier election results are fabricated official. With these security measures, election officials tin check to determine that devices are running the certified software and functioning properly.

Every state also has laws and processes to verify vote tallies earlier results are officially certified. Country processes include robust concatenation-of-custody procedures, auditable logs, and canvass processes. The vast bulk of votes bandage in this election will be bandage on newspaper ballots or using machines that produce a paper audit trail, which allow for tabulation audits to be conducted from the paper tape in the event any problems emerge with the voting system software, audit logs, or tabulation. These canvas and certification procedures are too generally conducted in the public middle, as political party representatives and other observers are typically allowed to exist present, to add an boosted layer of verification. This means voting system software is not a single indicate of failure and such systems are subject field to multiple audits to ensure accurateness and reliability. For example, some counties conduct multiple audits, including a post-election logic and accuracy test of the voting system, and a bipartisan mitt count of paper ballots.

Useful Sources

• Election Results Reporting Risks and Mitigations Infographic, CISA
• Election Infrastructure Cyber Gamble Cess and Infographic, CISA
• Postal service-in Voting Integrity Safeguards Infographic, CISA
• Postal service-in Voting Processing Factors Map (Updated Oct 29, 2020), CISA
• Post-Election Process Mapping Infographic, CISA
• Your local or land election officials. EAC state-past-state directory
• Post-election audits, NCSL
• Policies for Election Observers, NSCL
• Tabulation Security, Maricopa County AZ
• Link direct to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor17

Reality: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Bureau (CISA) do not design or inspect ballots, which are processes managed by state and local ballot officials.

Rumor: DHS or CISA printed paper ballots with security measures and is auditing results as a countermeasure confronting ballot counterfeiting.

Go the Facts:While DHS and CISA assist states and localities with securing election infrastructure, DHS and CISA do not design, print, or audit ballots. State and local election officials manage ballot design and press, also as the auditing of results.

Local ballot offices have security and detection measures in place that make information technology highly difficult to commit fraud through counterfeit ballots. While the specific measures vary, in accord with state and local election laws and practices, election security measures can include signature matching, information checks, barcodes, watermarks, and precise paper weights.

DHS and CISA operate in support of state and local ballot officials, and practice not administrate elections or handle ballots. CISA'southward office in election security includes sharing data, such as cyber threat indicators, with state and local election officials, likewise as providing technical cybersecurity services (eastward.g., vulnerability scanning) upon the request of those officials. CISA funded an independent tertiary-political party to develop an open-source ballot auditing tool for voluntary use past state and local election officials. (Note: The previous judgement was updated nine November 2020.) CISA does not audit elections and does not have access to the tool equally states use information technology.

Useful Sources

• Election Infrastructure Security, CISA
• Election Security, DHS
• Federal Role in U.South. Campaigns and Elections: An Overview, CRS
• Mail-in Voting Integrity Safeguards Infographic, CISA
• Mail-in Voting 2022 Adventure Assessment, CISA
• Risk-Limiting Audits with Arlo, Voting Works
• Your local or country ballot officials EAC state-by-state directory
• Link direct to this rumor by using: https://world wide web.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor19

Reality: Election results reporting may occur more slowly than some voters expect. This alone does non indicate a problem with the counting procedure or results, or that in that location are bug affecting the integrity of the ballot. Official results are non certified until all validly cast ballots have been counted, including ballots that are legally counted after election dark.

Rumor: If results as reported on election night change over the ensuing days or weeks, the process is hacked or compromised, so I can't trust the results.

Become the Facts:The timeline for reporting election results may be impacted past a number of factors, including changes to state or local level policies that impact how the election is administered, changes to when ballots can be processed, or additional protocols implemented to make voting and vote processing safer during the pandemic. Ballot results reported on election night are always unofficial and are provided solely for voters' convenience. In fact, no land requires that official results be certified on election night itself. Fluctuations in unofficial results reporting will occur during and after election night as more ballots are candy and counted, frequently including armed services and overseas ballots, and validated provisional ballots. Variations in state processes may too mean ballots cast through different methods (due east.g., early on in-person voting, mail service-in voting, and election solar day voting) are counted and unofficially reported in unlike orders. Official results are released after rigorous canvassing (verification) and certification by local and country ballot officials.

Useful Sources

• FBI-CISA Public Service Announcement: Strange Actors and Cybercriminals Likely to Spread Disinformation Regarding 2022 Ballot Results
• Election Results Reporting Risks and Mitigations, CISA
• Mail-in Voting 2022 Hazard Cess, CISA
• Post-in Voting Integrity Safeguards Infographic, CISA
• Post-in Voting Processing Factors Map (Updated October 29, 2020), CISA
• Postal service-Election Process Mapping Infographic, CISA
• USPS Election Mail Information Eye, USPS
• Federal Election Results FAQs, CRS
• Land Election Canvassing Timeframes and Recount Thresholds, NASS
• After the Voting Ends: The Steps to Complete an Election, NCSL
• Election Security Country Policies, NCSL
• Changes to Mail in Voting in 2020, NCSL
• Link direct to this rumor past using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor14

Reality: Provisional ballots are counted in every election regardless of outcome margins.

Rumor: Provisional ballots are only counted if in that location's a close race.

Get the Facts:All provisional ballots are reviewed by election officials in every election regardless of result margins. Conditional ballots cast by individuals whose eligibility can be verified are counted. Additionally, election officials are required to provide individuals who cast provisional ballots written information regarding how they can decide whether their vote was counted and, if it was non counted, the reason for its rejection.

Useful Sources

• 52 U.South.C. § 21082
• Post-Election Process Mapping Infographic, CISA
• Provisional Ballots, NCSL
• State Policies on Voting In-Person or Irresolute Vote Afterward Requesting a Mail/Absentee Ballot, NASS
• Your local or state ballot officials. EAC state-by-state directory
• Link direct to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor15

Reality: In some circumstances, elections officials are permitted to "duplicate" or otherwise further marker cast ballots to ensure they can be properly counted.

Rumor: Witnessing election officials mark ballots means that fraudulent voting is taking place.

Go the Facts:Some ballots cannot be read by a ballot scanner due to problems such as damage or misprinting. Some jurisdictions paw count such ballots, while others create duplicate ballots then they can be read by a ballot scanner. Some jurisdictions permit ballot officials to enhance markings on ballots that are too faint to scan following a process to adjudicate the voter's intent based on country law. In jurisdictions where duplication of unscannable ballots is permitted, election officials duplicate the ballot precisely to ensure all the voter'south choices are transferred correctly to the new ballot. Both the original and indistinguishable election are labeled and logged and then that the two ballots can be tracked and audited. Many jurisdictions require bipartisan teams of ii or four personnel to complete this process and verify that votes are accurately transferred to duplicated ballots. The procedure is oftentimes open up to public observation.

In some jurisdictions, ballot duplication is referred to equally ballot remaking, ballot replication, or ballot transcription.

Useful Sources

• Afterwards the Voting Ends: The Steps to Complete an Ballot, NCSL
• Ballot Duplication blog series, Quango of Country Governments Overseas Voting Initiative
• Your local or state election officials EAC state-by-land directory.
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor16

Reality: Election night results are non official results.

Rumor: If election night reporting sites experience an outage, vote counts will be lost or manipulated.

Get the Facts: Ballot dark results are not official results. These sites may feel outages due to a diverseness of issues including also many people trying to view the site or cyberattacks. Such disruptions do not bear on the integrity of votes or the official certified results. Election results fabricated available on election night are always unofficial. Official results are rigorously canvassed (reviewed), and certified past local and state election officials. Virtually states have requirements for mail service-election audits as well.

Useful Sources

• FBI-CISA Public Service Annunciation: Strange Actors and Cybercriminals Probable to Spread Disinformation Regarding 2022 Election Results
• FBI-CISA Public Service Announcement: Cyber Threats to Voting Processes Could Tiresome Only Not Prevent Voting
• Mail-Election Process Mapping Infographic, CISA
• Federal Election Results FAQs, CRS
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor11

Reality: A defaced or manipulated election night reporting webpage would not impact counting and certification of official results.

Rumor: If the election night reporting webpage is defaced or displays wrong results, the integrity of the election is compromised.

Become the Facts: If a webpage has been defaced or is displaying incorrect results, it would not bear upon the integrity of votes or the official certified results. Ballot results made available on election dark are ever unofficial.

Useful Sources

• FBI-CISA Public Service Declaration: Strange Actors and Cybercriminals Probable to Spread Disinformation Regarding 2022 Ballot Results
• FBI-CISA Public Service Annunciation: Cyber Threats to Voting Processes Could Dull But Not Prevent Voting
• Post-Election Procedure Mapping Infographic, CISA
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor12
  

Reality: Malicious actors can use fake personas and impersonate existent accounts.

Rumor: If a social media account claims an identity, the account must be run by that person or organization.

Go the Facts:Malicious actors often employ fake personas and impersonate real accounts to play a trick on the public into assertive disinformation, including election-related disinformation.

Popular social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Snapchat, and others provide an indication, such equally a checkmark that is either blue or greyness, to bespeak that an business relationship is verified by the platform.  If an account claims to be a well-known person or official organization but is not verified, they may be an imposter.

There are multiple things to await for if you recall an account is fake or spoofed. Is the account make new? Do they create content or merely re-share? Practise they take a coherent profile description and does it match what they are sharing? Do they accept a real profile photo?  A best practice when looking for ballot-related information is to become to trusted sources, like your local election official.

If you find a suspicious social media mail or account, consider reporting the activeness to the platform so others don't get duped. Most platforms accept a "written report" function congenital into posts, and so it's easy to report suspicious items, such every bit misinformation about ballot infrastructure. If an account is posting election disinformation, consider reporting to your state or local ballot official.

Useful Sources

• Election Mis-, Dis-, and Malinformation Toolkit, CISA
• #TrustedInfo2020, NASS
• Voter Resources: State Voter Information, NASED
• Voting and Elections Data, usa.gov
• Your local or state election officials EAC land-by-land directory
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor1

Reality: Cyber actors tin can "spoof" or forge email sender addresses to await similar they come from someone else.

Rumor: I received an election-related email that looks like information technology came from a certain arrangement, then the organisation must have sent it.

Get the Facts:Cyber actors can forge emails to look like they came from someone else. This common tactic is chosen email spoofing, where attackers send an e-mail pretending to exist from a specific domain or organization in an try to harvest personal information or spread malware. Such spoofed emails can likewise be used to disseminate false or inflammatory data. To send realistic-looking emails, cyber actors may forge the sender address to hibernate the origin of an email or set up spoofed domains that have a slightly different proper noun from the real domain. E'er be wary of out of the ordinary emails and look to trusted sources, such every bit the system'due south official website, in lodge to verify. Never provide personal information or download files from suspicious emails. If you receive a suspicious election-related email, consider reporting it to your local election official or local FBI field role.

Useful Sources

• FBI-CISA Public Service Proclamation: Spoofed Net Domains and Electronic mail Accounts Pose Cyber and Disinformation Risks to Voters
• Deportment to Counter Electronic mail-based Attacks on Election-Related Entities, CISA
• Enhanced Email and Web Security, CISA
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://world wide web.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor2

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Pre-Ballot

Reality: Voting systems undergo testing from state and/or federal voting system testing programs, which certify voting organisation hardware and software.

Rumor: Voting system software is not reviewed or tested and can be easily manipulated.

Get the Facts:Before use in elections, voting systems undergo hardware and software testing to ensure they are consequent with state and/or federal requirements. Nether these programs, voting arrangement manufacturers submit systems to undergo testing and review by an accredited laboratory or country testers. This testing is designed to cheque that systems office as designed and meet applicative state and/or federal requirements or standards for accuracy, privacy and accessibility. Certification testing usually includes a review of a organization's source code equally well as environmental, security and functional testing. Depending on the country, this testing may be conducted by a state-certified laboratory, a partner university, and/or a federally certified testing laboratory.

Before local jurisdictions learn voting systems, voting systems must go through a testing procedure to ensure compliance with the land'southward standards and, in many states, federal standards besides. While each land sets specific standards for voting systems, many states leverage the Voluntary Voting Organisation Guidelines developed by the U.South. Ballot Assistance Committee.

One time systems are deemed compliant with applicable state and federal standards, jurisdictions also conduct logic and accuracy testing before deployment of a voting car to ensure proper functioning and to detect whatever malicious or anomalous software issues. Post-election audits also help ensure the proper operation of voting equipment.

Useful Sources:

• 52 UsaC. §§ 20971, 21081
• Voting Organization Certification Process, EAC
• Election Infrastructure Security, CISA
• Election Infrastructure Cyber Risk Assessment and Infographic, CISA
• Voting Organisation Standards, Testing and Certification, NCSL
• Postal service-Election Audits, NCSL
• Your local or state election officials. EAC state-by-state directory
• Link directly to this rumor past using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor23

Reality: Voter registration list maintenance and other ballot integrity measures protect against voting illegally on behalf of deceased individuals.

Rumor: Votes are being bandage on behalf of dead people and these votes are beingness counted.

Get the Facts: State and Federal laws prohibit voter impersonation, including casting a ballot on behalf of a deceased individual. Election officials regularly remove deceased individuals from voter registration rolls based on death records shared by country vital statistics agencies and the Social Security Administration. While in that location can exist some lag time betwixt a person'south death and their removal from the voter registration list, which can lead to some mail-in ballots being delivered to addresses of deceased individuals, death records provide a potent audit trail to identify any illegal attempts to cast ballots on behalf of deceased individuals. Additional election integrity safeguards, including signature matching and information checks, further protect against voter impersonation and voting by ineligible persons.

In some instances, living persons may return mail-in ballots or vote early on in-person, and and then die before Election Day. Some states permit such voters' ballots to be counted, while others disallow such ballots and follow procedures to identify and reject them during processing.

Taken out of context, some voter registration information may appear to advise suspicious action, merely are actually innocuous clerical errors or the consequence of intended data practices. For example, election officials in some states utilise temporary placeholder data for registrants whose birth date or year is not known (e.g., 1/ane/1900, which makes such registrants announced to exist 120 years old). In other instances, a voting-age child with the same proper noun and address as their deceased parent could be misinterpreted as a deceased voter or lead to clerical errors.

Useful Sources

• eighteen United states of americaC. § 1708
• 52 U.S.C. §§ 10307(c), 20507, 20511(2), 21083(a)(2)(A)
• Mail service-in Voting Integrity Safeguards Infographic, CISA
• Election Infrastructure Cyber Risk Assessment and Infographic, CISA
• Election Infrastructure Security, CISA
• Election Security, DHS
• The National Voter Registration Human activity of 1993: Questions and Answers, DOJ
• Election Mail service Data Centre, USPS
• Your local or land election officials. EAC country-by-state directory
• Maintenance of Land Voter Registration Lists, NASS
• What If an Absentee Voter Dies Before Ballot Mean solar day?, NCSL
• Voter List Accurateness, NCSL
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor21

Reality: Some voter registration data is publicly available.

Rumor: Someone possessing or posting voter registration data ways voter registration databases have been hacked .

Go the Facts: Some voter registration information is public information and is available to political campaigns, researchers, and often members of the public, often for purchase. Co-ordinate to a recent FBI and CISA public alarm, cyber actors may make false claims of "hacked" voter information to undermine confidence in U.South. autonomous institutions.

Useful Sources

• Availability of State Voter File and Confidential Information
• FBI-CISA Public Service Announcement: False Claims of Hacked Voter Information Probable Intended to Bandage Doubt on Legitimacy of U.Due south. Elections
• Admission To and Use Of Voter Registration Lists, NCSL
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor3

Reality: Online voter registration websites tin feel outages for not-malicious reasons.

Rumor: An online voter registration website experiences an outage and claims are made the election has been compromised.

Get the Facts: Outages in online voter registration systems occur for a variety of reasons, including configuration errors, hardware issues, natural disasters, communications infrastructure bug, and distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. Equally CISA and FBI warned in a recent public alert, a system outage does non necessarily mean the integrity of voter registration information or whatever other ballot system has been impacted. When an outage occurs, ballot officials work to verify the integrity of voter registration information.

Useful Sources

• FBI-CISA Public Service Declaration: Imitation Claims of Hacked Voter Information Probable Intended to Bandage Doubt on Legitimacy of U.S. Elections
• Securing Voter Registration Data, CISA
• Your local or state election officials EAC state-past-state directory
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://world wide web.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor4

Reality: A compromise of a state or local government system does not necessarily mean election infrastructure or the integrity of your vote has been compromised.

Rumor: If land or local jurisdiction information technology (IT) has been compromised, the ballot results cannot exist trusted.

Go the Facts: Hacks of state and local IT systems should not be minimized; however, a compromise of state or local IT systems does not hateful those systems are election-related. Fifty-fifty if an election-related system is compromised, a compromise of a organisation does not necessarily mean the integrity of the vote has been affected. Ballot officials accept multiple safeguards and contingencies in place, including provisional ballots or fill-in paper poll books that limit the bear upon from a cyber incident with minimal disruption to voting.  Additionally, having an auditable newspaper record ensures that the vote count can be verified and validated.

Useful Sources

• FBI-CISA Public Service Announcement: Cyber Threats to Voting Processes Could Slow Merely Non Forestall Voting
• Election Infrastructure Cyber Risk Assessment and Infographic, CISA
• Link direct to this rumor past using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor5

Reality: Malicious actors can fake manipulation of voter registration data to spread disinformation.

Rumor: Videos, images or emails suggesting voter registration information is being manipulated means voters will not be able to vote.

Get the Facts: Claims are like shooting fish in a barrel to fake and can be used for disinformation purposes. If voter registration data were to be manipulated, states have several safeguards in place to enable voters to vote, including offline backups of registration data, provisional ballots, and in several states, same-day registration.

Useful Sources

• FBI-CISA Public Service Announcement: Faux Claims of Hacked Voter Information Likely Intended to Cast Doubt on Legitimacy of U.S. Elections
• Securing Voter Registration Data, CISA
• Securing Voter Registration Systems, NCSL
• Link direct to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor6

Reality: Safeguards are in identify to foreclose dwelling-printed or photocopied mail service-in ballots from being counted.

Rumor: A malicious role player can easily defraud an ballot by press and sending in extra mail-in ballots.

Get the Facts: This is simulated. Committing fraud through photocopied or habitation-printed ballots would be highly difficult to exercise successfully. This is because each local election part has security measures in place to detect such malicious activeness. While the specific measures vary, in accordance with state and local election laws and practices, such security measures include signature matching, information checks, barcodes, watermarks, and precise paper weights.

Useful Source

• Mail-in Voting Election Integrity Safeguards Infographic, CISA
• Link direct to this rumor past using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor7

Reality: Safeguards are in place to protect against fraudulent voting using the Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot (FWAB).

Rumor: A malicious actor tin can hands defraud an election using the Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot (FWAB).

Get the Facts:Changing an election using fraudulently submitted FWABs would be highly difficult to do. This is because election offices have security measures in place to detect such action.

The FWAB is primarily used every bit a backup election for military and overseas voters who requested only did not all the same receive their absentee election. FWAB users must provide their signature and meet varying state voter registration and absentee election request requirements, which tin can include provision of total or partial social security number, state identification number, proof of identification, and/or witness signature.

Since simply military and overseas voters are eligible to use the FWAB, relatively few of them are submitted each ballot. In 2016, states reported that only 23,291 full FWABs were submitted nationwide, with all merely vi states receiving less than one,000 FWABs statewide. Since employ is relatively rare, spikes in FWAB usage would be detected equally anomalous.

Useful Sources

• 52 U.s.a.C. § 20303
• Voting Assistance Guide, FVAP
• Election Forms and Tools for Sending, FVAP
• 2016 Election Assistants and Voting Survey Comprehensive Report, EAC
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://world wide web.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor8

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Election Twenty-four hour period

Reality: Ballot officials provide writing instruments that are approved for mark ballots to all in-person voters using mitt-marked paper ballots.

Rumor: Poll workers gave specific writing instruments, such as Sharpies, but to specific voters to cause their ballots to be rejected.

Get the Facts: Election jurisdictions allow voters to marking ballots with varying types of writing instruments, based on state law and other considerations such as tabulation arrangement requirements. Poll workers are required to provide approved writing devices to voters.

Although felt-tip pens, like Sharpies, may bleed through ballots, some ballot officials have stated that ballot tabulation equipment in their jurisdictions can still read these ballots. Many jurisdictions even design their ballots with offset columns to preclude whatever potential bleed through from impacting the power to hands browse both sides of ballots.

If a ballot has issues that touch on its power to be scanned, it can be hand counted or duplicated, or adjudicated past ballot officials, who utilise divers procedures such equally chain of custody to ensure protect election secrecy and integrity. Many states additionally have "voter intent" laws that allow for ballots to be counted even when issues such as drain-throughs or stray marks are present, as long as the voter's intent tin can withal be determined.

Useful Sources

• After the Voting Ends: The Steps to Complete an Election, NCSL
• Ballot Duplication blog serial, Council of Country Governments Overseas Voting Initiative
• Your local or state election officials. EAC state-by-state directory
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor18

Reality: Voters are protected by country and federal constabulary from threats or intimidation at the polls, including from election observers.

Rumor: Observers in the polling place are permitted to intimidate voters, campaign, and interfere with voting.

Get the Facts:While nearly states have a process to permit a limited number of credentialed or registered observers at in-person voting locations to observe the voting process, state and federal laws offer voters general protection from threats and intimidation, including from observers. States use varying terms for observers, including "poll watchers," "challengers," and "poll agents." In full general, observers are prohibited from violating ballot secrecy, campaigning, collecting private voter information, and obstructing or interfering with the voting process. Observers in some states may study potential bug to election officials, such as questioned eligibility of a voter, suspicious beliefs, or suspected rule violations. Intimidation or threatening behavior is never permissible.

Under certain circumstances, the U.S. Section of Justice (DOJ) Civil Rights Partitioning may monitor polling place procedures for the protection of voters under federal voting rights laws. International observers, including delegations from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe or the Arrangement for American States, who have been invited by the U.Due south. Department of State, may as well observe in-person voting processes in some states.

If you feel that you've been a victim of, or witnessed, voter intimidation or threats, please report the experience to the DOJ Civil Rights Division's Voting Section past phone 800-253-3931 or through its complaint portal at https://civilrights.justice.gov/. If you feel an emergency, please call 911.

Useful Sources

• 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(1)(A), xviii UsaC. § 594, 52 U.S.C. § 20511, 18 The statesC. §§ 241 and 242
• Election Crimes and Security, FBI
• Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses, DOJ
• About Federal Observers and Election Monitoring, DOJ
• State Laws on Poll Watchers and Challengers, NASS
• Poll Watchers and Challengers, NCSL
• Policies for Ballot Observers, NCSL
• OSCE/ODIHR Election Ascertainment USA 2022 Factsheet, OSCE
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor13

Reality: Safeguards are in identify to protect ballot secrecy.

Rumor: Someone is claiming to know who I voted for.

Become the Facts:Ballot secrecy is guaranteed past law in all states. Election officials implement various safeguards to protect voters' choices from being viewable or knowable by others, including the election officials themselves. With few exceptions, these security measures ensure that individual ballots, once cast, cannot be traced back to the voters who cast them. For in-person voting, privacy measures include dividers between voting stations and requirements that poll workers maintain distance from voters while they are casting their ballots. For mail-in and conditional voting, election officials follow strict procedures to ensure ballot secrecy when ballots are retrieved from mail-in and provisional election envelopes.

Ballot secrecy rights may be voluntarily waived past voters in sure circumstances, and waiver may be required in some of these, such as military and overseas voters that vote by fax or e-mail.

While election choices are underground in virtually all circumstances, a voter's political party affiliation and history of voting generally are not. Information contained in voter registration records, such as proper noun, accost, phone number, and political party affiliation (in states with political party-based voter registration), is generally bachelor to political parties and others. This data too regularly contains information on whether a voter voted in a particular election, but not their ballot choices.

Useful Sources

• Voting Exterior the Polling Place: Absentee, All-Mail and other Voting at Home Options, NCSL
• Secrecy of the Ballot and Election Selfies, NCSL
• States that are Required to Provide Secrecy Sleeves for Absentee/Mail Ballots, NCSL
• Admission To and Utilise of Voter Registration Lists, NCSL
• Link directly to this rumor past using: https://world wide web.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor9

Reality: Polling place lookup sites can experience outages for non-malicious reasons.

Rumor: If polling place lookup sites experience an outage, election infrastructure must accept been compromised.

Become the Facts: Polling place lookup sites, like all websites, may experience outages for a diversity of reasons, impacting their availability to voters. Polling place lookup sites are not continued to infrastructure that counts votes and are typically segmented from infrastructure that enables voting, such as the voter registration database. Election officials volition indicate potential voters to alternating tools and resources for this information in the event of an issue.

Useful Sources

• Ballot Infrastructure Cyber Risk Assessment and Infographic, CISA
• Your local or state ballot officials EAC country-past-state directory
• Link directly to this rumor by using: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol#rumor10
  

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Source: https://www.cisa.gov/rumorcontrol

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